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For more than three decades, critics and supporters of affirmative action have fought for the moral
high ground  n through ballot initiatives and lawsuits, in state legislatures, and in varied courts of
public opinion. The goal of this paper is to show the clarifying power of economic reasoning to
dispel some myths and misconceptions in the racial affirmative action debates. We enumerate seven
commonly held (but mistaken) views one often encounters in the folklore about affirmative action
(affirmative action may involve goals and timelines, but definitely not quotas, e.g.). Simple
economic arguments reveal these seven views to be more myth than fact.
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Affirmative action policy regulates the allocation of scarce positions in education, 
employment, or business contracting so as to increase the representation in those positions of 
persons belonging to certain population subgroups.  Such policies are highly controversial. For 
more than three decades, critics and supporters of affirmative action have fought for the moral high 
ground – through ballot initiatives and lawsuits, in state legislatures, and in varied courts of public 
opinion. The goal of this paper is to show the clarifying power of economic reasoning, when it is 
used with a healthy dose of common sense, to dispel some myths and misconceptions in the racial 
affirmative action debates.   
The sort of analysis presented in this paper will not change the positions of diehards who 
are unalterably committed to supporting or opposing affirmative action, and who view their 
positions as required by basic principles of justice. But most Americans do not hold extreme beliefs 
about affirmative action; indeed, the American public embraces no coherent conception of what 
“affirmative action” actually entails.  When President Bill Clinton directed a team of aides to 
undertake a comprehensive review of the federal government’s racial preference policies, the 
inquiry found that Americans held wide-ranging and conflicting views about what is meant by 
“affirmative action.”  Investigators concluded that this lack of coherence fostered an atmosphere of 
confusion about what these policies aimed to achieve and how they were implemented (Edley, 
1996).   
There is a growing literature on the fragility of views regarding affirmative action. Bositis 
(2004) asked subjects to respond to the following statement, “We should make every possible 
effort to improve the position of blacks and other minorities,” with which 75 percent of blacks, 67 
percent of whites, and 80 percent of Hispanics agreed. However, when subjects were asked to   2 
respond to an alternate statement --  “We should make every possible effort to improve the position 
of blacks and other minorities, even if it involves preferential treatment” -- only 57 percent of 
blacks, 48 percent of Hispanics, and 33 percent of whites agreed. Bositis also found that the 
presence of the term “preferential treatment” had its most pronounced negative impact on support 
for assisting racial minorities when the context involved race-based preferences in college 
admissions.  Moreover, and perhaps most disturbingly, Sniderman and Piazza (1993 pp. 102-104) 
find that in a comparison of two groups of similar whites, individuals to whom affirmative action 
was mentioned showed a significantly higher tendency to affirm  negative racial stereotypes about 
blacks like “most blacks are lazy” than did those to whom affirmative action was not mentioned at 
all. Given this conceptual incoherence, it is hardly surprising that many survey researchers now 
avoid using the ambiguous term “affirmative action”  altogether, opting instead to describe a 
program’s specific content in their questionnaires (for example, Kravitz et al., 1996). 
When concepts are unclear, misunderstandings can easily take root. This paper enumerates 
seven commonly held but mistaken views one often encounters in the folklore about affirmative 
action. 1) Affirmative action may involve goals and timelines, but definitely not quotas. 2) Color-
blind policies offer an efficient substitute for color-sighted affirmative action. 3) Affirmative action 
creates opportunities but does not undercut incentives. 4) Passing equal opportunity laws is enough 
to ensure racial equality. 5) The earlier affirmative action is used in education or career 
development, the better. 6) Many whites are directly affected by affirmative action policies 
designed to increase representation of minorities. 7) Affirmative action always helps its intended 
beneficiaries. We discuss each of these beliefs in turn and provide economic arguments that reveal 
them to be more myth than fact.  
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Myth #1: Affirmative Action Can Involve Goals and Timetables while Avoiding Quotas. 
 
  The belief that it is possible to draw a meaningful distinction between “goals” and “quotas” 
is found on both sides of the affirmative action debate. Supporters of affirmative action typically 
endorse goals, but back away from quotas. Here is President Bill Clinton (1995), defending 
affirmative action in his “Mend it Don’t End It” speech: “Since President Nixon was here in my 
job, America has used goals and timetables to preserve opportunity and to prevent discrimination, 
to urge businesses to set higher expectations, and to realize those expectations. But we did not and 
we will not use rigid quotas to mandate outcomes.” Likewise, President George W. Bush (2004) 
leaned heavily on this alleged distinction when, in commenting on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
the University of Michigan affirmative action cases, he said: “I agreed with the Court … that we 
ought to reject quotas. I think quotas are discriminatory by nature... We also agreed with the 
finding that, in terms of admissions policy, race-neutral admissions policies ought to be tried. If 
they don' t work, to achieve an objective which is diversification, race ought to be a factor... I think 
it’s very important for all institutions to strive for diversity, and I believe there are ways to do so.” 
  Yet this distinction between goals and quotas is dubious, because to implement either a goal 
or quota requires that a regulator credibly commit to some (possibly unspoken) schedule of 
rewards/penalties for an employer or an education institution, as a function of observable and 
verifiable outcomes.  The results engendered by either policy depend on how firms or educational 
institutions react to these incentives.  If the penalty for certain “bad results” is sufficiently severe, 
then people will tend to say that a rigid quota had been imposed.  If penalties for bad results are 
minimal, then the people will tend to say that a flexible goal has been adopted. Clearly, this 
difference is one of degree, not of kind.   4 
For similar reasons, neither can one draw a sharp distinction between the use of numerical 
hiring goals on the one hand, and the mere enforcement of a regime of non-racial discrimination, 
on the other.  When anti-discrimination law enforcement agents are less well informed than are 
potentially discriminating employers, any effective enforcement policy will have quota-like effects.  
To see this point, imagine that a government entity is trying to enforce laws against racial 
discrimination by auditing employers’ hiring practices.  Suppose that employers differ, both in their 
proclivities to discriminate and in the fraction of qualified minorities applying for positions in their 
firms.  Assume that the auditor can perfectly observe neither a firm’s proclivity to discriminate, nor 
all of the characteristics of its applicant pool, but that the auditor can observe the rate at which 
minorities are actually hired at any firm.  Then, the observation of a low hiring rate for minorities is 
consistent with two alternative interpretations: either the employer is a discriminator who rejected 
qualified minority candidates, or the employer is a non-discriminator who happened to draw a 
small fraction of qualified minority applicants.  Because an outside law enforcement official can 
never perfectly distinguish between these two situations, a vigorous effort to limit discrimination 
will on occasion be subject to both type I and type II errors.  That is, the employers who did not 
discriminate will sometimes be punished, and those who did discriminate will sometimes go 
unpunished.  As a result, even those employers who do not wish to discriminate for or against 
minority workers will nevertheless have an incentive to alter their hiring practices if they happen to 
draw an unusually low number of qualified minority applicants, because doing so reduces their risk 
of being audited and undeservedly punished. 
In this specific sense, then, given a legal environment that eschews affirmative action and 
requires only nondiscrimination, employers will nevertheless behave as if they faced an “implicit 
quota” (Fryer, 2004).  That is, they will adhere to a self-imposed hiring target which can be   5 
understood as their equilibrium response to incentives created by imperfect auditing.  So, a 
regulator enforcing anti-discrimination laws, who is less well informed than are employers about 
the qualifications of job applicants, will find that an effective enforcement regime must on occasion 
induce some departures from race-neutral hiring by the firms being regulated.  What is more, these 
induced departures from race-neutral hiring will generally favor members of the groups being 
protected from discrimination – which is to say, they will be hard to distinguish from racially 
preferential affirmative action.   
  A similar false distinction often encountered in the affirmative action debate is that between 
racial preferences, on the one hand, and the mere enhancement of efforts to attract qualified 
minority candidates, on the other.  Some opponents of affirmative action reject preferences but 
argue that race-targeted recruitment and outreach efforts (as exemplified by the phrase: “please 
alert us to qualified minority candidates”) are acceptable, so long as all applicants are judged by a 
common, race-independent standard.  Likewise, some supporters of affirmative action argue that to 
prefer a minority applicant whose qualifications are roughly the same as a non-minority competitor 
ought to offend no one.
1  Both of these arguments avoid the hard truth that targeted outreach will 
generally lead to an equilibrium in which the targeted applicants of a given skill level enjoy wider 
job options, more bargaining power and, consequently, greater remuneration than comparable non-
targeted applicants.   
 




                                                 
1 Although, as Bositis (2004) points out, roughly half of blacks and whites oppose offering a job to a black candidate 
when both she and a white candidate are equally qualified and blacks are underrepresented in the firm.   6 
  The belief that to achieve a color-blind society we are best advised to use color-blind (or, as 
they are sometimes called, “race neutral”) means was the driving force behind two ballot initiatives 
in California:  Proposition 209, which in 1996 successfully banned the use of affirmative action by 
state or local government (including state colleges and universities in their admissions decisions); 
and, Proposition 54, which unsuccessfully sought in 2003 to ban state and local government from 
collecting information that would permit them to categorize students, contractors or workers by 
race. The public relations campaign for Prop. 54, led by Ward Connerly, proclaimed (Racial 
Privacy Initiative, 2002): “Asking citizens to check a race box on a school or job application form 
is demeaning to the growing millions of our citizens who are multiracial and multiethnic.  It divides 
us as a people and forces Americans to pay more attention to immutable and meaningless 
characteristics like skin color and ancestry.”   
  Connerly’s view has some superficial plausibility, even if one begins with the assumption 
that achieving racial diversity is a compelling government objective.  After all, to abide by the 
color-blindness constraint in employee or student selection does not rule out the pursuit of greater 
representation for a disadvantaged group.
2 Group-representation goals can be sought tacitly under 
color-blindness:  selectors can favor a targeted racial group by over-emphasizing the non-racial 
factors that are relatively more likely to be found among members of that group.  For example, the 
states of California, Florida, and Texas now guarantee admission to their public university systems 
for all in-state high school students graduating in the top 4, 20, and 10 percent, respectively, of 
their senior classes. Since high schools across these states have different racial populations, this 
policy will tend to cause university admissions to mirror more closely the racial composition of the 
                                                 
2 Chan and Eyster (2003) were the first to make this point.  Independently, Fryer, Loury and Yuret (2003) advanced a 
related, though more general, analysis.   7 
state. We use the term “color-blind affirmative action” when referring to this kind of implicit racial 
preference.
3 
  Let us consider in more detail how color-blind affirmative action might work. Suppose that 
a college has the capacity to admit only a certain fraction of its applicants, and seeks to maximize 
the expected performance of those admitted.
4  Assume for the sake of this illustration that expected 
performance is a linear function of a student’s standardized test scores and that student’s level of 
involvement in extracurricular activities.  Then the college will admit an applicant if the value of 
this function exceeds some suitably chosen threshold.  The weight the college gives to 
extracurricular activities relative to test scores in this admissions policy function will equal the ratio 
of the partial correlations of these variables with post-admissions performance.
5  
Now, suppose the college believes that to follow this threshold policy would yield too few 
members of some racial group.  Imagine that the level of extracurricular activities is distributed 
among applicants within racial groups in approximately the same way, but that the within-group 
test score distributions differ substantially between the races.  Given this setup, a college could 
enhance racial diversity in a color-blind manner (although at some cost to expected performance 
among those admitted) by placing more weight on extracurricular activities relative to test scores 
than is warranted by the correlation of these variables with performance.  That is, the college could 
practice color-blind affirmative action by valuing an applicant’s traits in the admissions process not 
only because a variable might help forecast post-admissions performance, but also because that 
                                                 
3 Department of Education (2003) provides a range of examples illustrating how race-neutral admissions programs in 
higher education might work. 
4 As Sam Bowles has pointed out to us, an equally plausible objective function for colleges – one with quite different 
implications for admissions policy – would be to maximize the expected value-added to their students’ overall 
academic abilities as a result of being admitted.  Moreover, even if this were not a compelling goal for colleges acting 
on their own account,  it  might sbe the most reasonable social objective function.  That the interests of individual 
institutions may diverge from the interests of society at large is clear, in view of the fact that improving their relative 
ranking is a key goal for many colleges and universities, but this consideration may be of much less significance from 
the a social point of view. 
5 See Fryer, Loury and Yuret (2003) for a detailed model along these lines, and a formal demonstration of this result.   8 
trait might be associated with an applicant’s membership in the targeted racial group. The practice 
in California, Florida, and Texas – which guarantees admission to some students based solely on 
their high school class rank – is one way to implement such color-blind policy. Another method, 
recently enacted by Mt. Holyoke College, is to make reporting of an applicant’s test scores optional 
while committing that some portion of the incoming class will be chosen from among those who 
elect not to submit scores.  However, even though the targeted group may constitute only a small 
fraction of its applicant pool, to practice color-blind affirmative action in this way a college would 
need to bias its evaluation of all of its applicants, minorities and non-minorities alike. 
By evaluating applicants in a different manner from that which would maximize expected 
post-admission performance, color-blind affirmative action enhances racial diversity at the cost of 
lowering selection efficiency.  Of course, given a fixed distribution of traits among applicants, any 
affirmative action policy – blind or conventional – necessarily lowers the expected performance of 
those selected.
6  Otherwise, no policy to enhance racial diversity would be necessary.  Even so, for 
a fixed distribution of traits, any color-blind affirmative action policy is less efficient than the 
optimal color-sighted policy calibrated to achieve the same degree of racial diversity (Chan and 
Eyster, 2003; Epple, Romano and Sieg, 2003; Fryer, Loury and Yuret, 2003). This result follows 
from the fact that, in the absence of affirmative action, efficient selection entails using a universal 
threshold policy where all applicants expected to perform above some level are admitted.  
Consequently, the use of group-specific thresholds under affirmative action – with everyone being 
admitted whose expected performance exceeds a minimal level that is specific to their group – 
provides as close an approximation to the efficient policy as is possible, consistent with meeting a 
racial representation target.  In other words, color-sighted affirmative action uses racially 
                                                 
6 That this need not be true when the distribution of traits is endogenous is a principle implication of our discussion of 
Myth #3 below.   9 
discriminatory means when comparing applicants from different groups, but, unlike color-blind 
policy, it makes optimal use of all available, non-racial information when comparing applicants 
within groups. 
In the short run, with applicants’ traits given, the efficiency of color-blind affirmative action 
depends on how well one can proxy for race by using observable, non-racial characteristics that are 
not negatively correlated with a student’s performance. If, for instance, a college could perfectly 
forecast an applicant’s race by using some combination of the applicant’s name and date of birth, 
then that college could implement an admissions policy which, in effect, set separate thresholds of 
expected performance for each racial group, while being able truthfully to maintain that all of its 
applicants have been evaluated relative to a common, non-racial standard.  At some point, though, 
this effort to find perfect proxies for race ceases to be “color-blind” in any meaningful sense. In 
practice, since color-blind affirmative action generally shifts weight from academic characteristics 
to social characteristics, the policy will concurrently help Hispanics and low-income whites as well 
as blacks.
 7   
  Moreover, as emphasized by Fryer, Loury and Yuret (2003), color-blind affirmative action 
is likely to be inefficient over the long run as well.  In any proper long run analysis, the distribution 
of applicants’ traits must be allowed to shift in response to the incentives created by the colleges’ 
policies. Because color-blind policy works by biasing the weights put on non-racial traits when 
assessing all applicants, the policy creates a situation where the incentive for students to acquire 
traits diverges from the relative importance of those traits in a college’s estimate of post-admission 
performance.  For example, in states using a top-x-percent scheme, students have an incentive to 
enroll in high schools (or particular courses within a high school) at which they expect to perform 
relatively well. So, “top-x-percent” policies should be expected to alter the way that students and 
                                                 
7 For plausible estimates of the possible magnitudes, see Fryer, Loury and Yuret (2003).   10 
high schools of varying qualities are matched with one another in equilibrium. There is no reason 
to expect that such a shift in resource allocation induced by color-blind affirmative action will 
promote efficiency.
8  Similarly, a policy that raises the weight on extra-curricular activities relative 
to standardized test scores in the admissions process must lower pre-application incentives for 
students to acquire skills that enhance performance on such tests.  To the extent that such skills also 
enhance post-admission performance, shifting from color-sighted to color- blind affirmative action 
policies could lead to an overall applicant pool that is less academically promising.
9 
 
Myth 3: Affirmative Action Undercuts Investment Incentives. 
 
  It is theoretically possible that the existence of affirmative action could reduce incentives 
for effort and skill acquisition in the targeted group, because the policy could make effort and skill 
less important for achieving successful outcomes.  On the other hand, affirmative action could 
enhance incentives for the targeted group by creating a situation where opportunities previously 
thought of as out of reach come to be perceived by the applicant as attainable, and thus worth the 
expenditure of effort to pursue.  Supporters of racial preferences tend to downplay possible adverse 
                                                 
8 As discussed in note 5 above, the private goals of colleges in the admissions process need not coincide with social 
objectives.  For instance, society may care about how students of different races and varying abilities are sorted among 
the high schools in a state, while this might matter little to a college.  To this extent, the bias in colleges’ admissions 
policies induced by color-blind affirmative action could, in principle, enhance social efficiency over the long run. 
9 Card and Krueger (2004) have studied the effects of this shift on applicant behavior in California and Texas. Using 
data on SAT test takers, they examine how eliminating color-sighted affirmative action in these states has affected the 
rate at which minority students send their test scores to selective public universities. They find no change in the SAT-
sending behavior of highly qualified black and Hispanic students.  They also find that the shift in policy had no effect 
on the number of schools to which these students applied, and did not significantly alter the quality of their fall-back 
schools. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the shift from color-sighted to color-blind affirmative 
action has had little impact on incentives for highly qualified minority students (which, given they are infra-marginal, 
is what one might expect.) A more persuasive test of this hypothesis would examine the impact of affirmative action on 
the grades and attendance patterns of high school students.  These outcomes are elastic with respect to effort, and are 
likely to vary with changes in students’ perceptions of college opportunities.     11 
incentive effects, while critics are dismissive of the prospect that the policy could provide 
incentives for better performance in a targeted group.  
Our view is that confident a priori assertions about how affirmative action affects incentives 
are unfounded.  Indeed, economic theory provides little guidance on what is ultimately a subtle and 
context-dependent empirical question.  First principles, commonsense intuitions, and anecdotal 
evidence are simply inadequate to the task here. 
It is useful in this context to think about affirmative action as a form of market regulation 
that induces a shift in demand for the services of persons at various skill levels in affected groups.  
For example, in a labor market context, racial preference policies may lead firms to hire or promote 
minority applicants at a given skill level, even though similar non-minority applicants would be 
rejected.  The consequence of such policy for incentives to acquire skills should thus depend on the 
relative magnitudes of these demand shifts, and on supply elasticities at the various skill levels.  If 
regulation causes firms to bid up the rewards to the highly skilled in the targeted group by more 
than to the less skilled, then skill-acquisition incentives will be enhanced.  Alternatively, given the 
relative supplies, if the demand for various skill grades within a preferred group were to rise in 
response to affirmative action policy in such a way that the less skilled gain more than the highly 
skilled, then skill-acquisition incentives will fall.  Thus, economic analysis suggests that the impact 
on incentives of preferential policies depends (perhaps in a counterintuitive way) on details of the 
specific environments into which they have been introduced. 
   Coate and Loury (1993) explore a model of the labor market where workers are minorities 
or non-minorities, and are qualified or unqualified.  Employers have a taste for discrimination; that 
is, they incur a non-economic cost of hiring minority workers which rises as minorities become a 
greater share of their workforce.  In the unregulated equilibrium of this model, qualified minority   12 
workers are not always hired, even though qualified non-minorities are fully employed, so the 
incentive for minorities to become skilled are lower than for non-minorities. Coate and Loury study 
how affirmative action policies intended to counter employers’ discriminatory preferences affect 
the equilibrium of this model.  They show that the impact of affirmative action on the incentives of 
minority workers to acquire skills depends critically on the aggressiveness of the plan.  Because 
employers discriminate, there is a surplus of qualified minorities prior to regulatory intervention – 
more minorities invest in skills than find employment.  If the affirmative action goal is modest, 
employers anticipate meeting the goal by dipping into this surplus of qualified minorities, which in 
turn raises the probability of a qualified minority being hired in equilibrium, thereby increasing the 
incentive for minority workers to become qualified and further narrowing the skill gap.  If, on the 
other hand, the affirmative action goal is highly ambitious, then employers will perceive a shortage 
of qualified minorities relative to the numbers needed to be in compliance with the regulations, and 
so they will be inclined to hire some who are unqualified, thereby lowering the minority incentives 
to invest in skills.  Coate and Loury call this outcome a patronizing equilibrium. 
This analysis suggests that affirmative action, even when introduced to counter employment 
discrimination by race, can embody an awkward trade-off: a highly aggressive plan risks inducing 
a patronizing equilibrium, whereas a more modest goal may not fully eliminate discrimination.  An 
intermediate policy would be to ratchet-up the affirmative action goal over time.  If a modest but 
not insignificant affirmative action goal is initially enacted in such a way that the first stage of the 
plan can be satisfied by drawing only on qualified minority applicants, then as these applicants are 
hired the incentive for minorities to acquire skills increases.  Then, in a later stage, the affirmative 
action goal can be set more ambitiously without moving incentives in the wrong direction; 
employers can draw on a larger pool of qualified minority applicants.     13 
 
Myth #4: Equal Opportunity Is Enough to Ensure Racial Equality. 
 
  Given the unlovely racial history of the United States, are equal opportunity laws enough to 
correct for centuries of institutional discrimination and social isolation?  Economists have pondered 
this question for decades.
10  If there had been equality of opportunity for all racial groups from the 
very beginning of the United States, then the ongoing enforcement of a non-discrimination regime 
might arguably suffice to secure racial equality today.  However, given that egregious violations of 
racial equality of opportunity are an historical fact, and under the plausible assumption that the 
evolution of inter-racial income distributions over the long run depends to some significant extent 
on initial conditions, there is a strong case for the view that achieving racial equality requires 
something more than the enforcement of non-discrimination from this point forward.  
Consider an environment in which, while job assignments are based solely on an 
individual’s productive characteristics, an individual’s acquisition of these characteristics is 
favorably influenced by the economic success of his or her parents. Thus, the toxic consequences 
of past discrimination for blacks are reflected in the fact that their children have less successful 
parents, on average, and therefore less favorable parental influences on their skill acquisition 
process. Further, imagine that families are grouped together into communities, and that local public 
goods like educational resources that are important for individual productivity are provided 
uniformly to children of the same community. In this setting, background influences achievement 
on two dimensions.  First, less successful parents are not as able to provide important resources that 
augment human capital development – such as career information, job referral networks and other 
                                                 
10 This inquiry began with Loury (1977, 1981a) and has spawned an impressive literature.   14 
forms of social and cultural capital.  Second, children with less successful parents will tend to live 
in communities with inferior local public goods. 
Now consider the following thought experiment:  Assume that all individuals have identical 
preferences, and that the distribution of innate abilities characterizing each generation of black and 
white children does not differ by race.  Assume further that peer effects operating at the 
neighborhood level strongly influence the acquisition of skills by the young.  Then, supposing that 
no anti-black discrimination occurs from a fixed point in time onward, one can ask whether a 
competitive market would eventually eliminate any initial differences in the average status of the 
two groups. 
Loury (1977) shows that the answer to this query depends on whether only income, or both 
income and race, affect the community to which an agent belongs.  When community membership 
depends only on income, equal opportunity can be shown always to yield a racially equitable long 
run outcome.  However, if race plays an independent role in sorting families into neighborhoods, 
then equal opportunity will generally not be enough to yield racial equity.
11 When some racial 
segregation exists among communities, the intergenerational status transmission mechanism differs 
substantially for the two racial groups. In essence, an intra-group externality is exerted through 
local public goods provision, by the lower income of black families who share a community. 
Because the racial composition of one’s community depends (in part) on the choices of one’s 
neighbors, this effect can not be completely undermined by an individual’s actions. Since social 
                                                 
11 Sethi and Somanathan (2004) is a recent effort to model endogenous community formation when agents care about 
both the income and the racial composition of their neighborhoods.  They show that in the extreme case where 
communities are segregated by race and income, but where the intra-racial distributions of income among blacks and 
whites are nearly identical then, in the unique stable spatial equilibrium, the provision of local public goods in the two 
communities will be nearly equal as well.  Under such circumstances, equal opportunity alone may suffice.  As an 
empirical matter, we are unaware of any such environments.      15 
clustering by ethnicity and race is empirically relevant and has been observed since the dawn of its 
measurement, equal opportunity from this point forward is unlikely to assure racial equity. 
In the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Grutter v. Bollinger (02-241 [2003]), involving 
the application of affirmative action standard in admissions to the University of Michigan,  
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor took an intriguing stand on equal opportunity and racial equity: 
“Race-conscious admission policies must be limited in time and the court expects that 25 years 
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be needed to further the interest approved 
today.”  A recent paper by Krueger, Rothstein, and Turner (2004) evaluates the plausibility of 
O’Connor’s forecast by projecting what the elite college applicant pool can be expected to look like 
25 years ahead. Their thought experiment rests on a number of assumptions regarding the rate at 
which existing racial gaps in economic circumstances and pre-collegiate educational achievement 
will likely close in the future. The analysis is focused on two important margins: changes in the 
black-white income distribution and the convergence in test scores among students with similar 
family income.  They argue that Justice O’Connor was overly optimistic; that is, blacks are 
unlikely to witness the dramatic convergence needed to make affirmative action in college 
admissions superfluous in 25 years. Theyestimate that, were all affirmative action in college 
admissions to be eliminated, then expected minority gains in income and socioeconomic status over 
the next quarter century would yield only 42 percent of the current level of racial diversity in 
selective institutions.  
 
Myth #5: The Earlier in Education or Career Development Affirmative Action is 
Implemented, the Better. 
   16 
  Critics of racial preferences in higher education often arguethat affirmative action should be 
undertaken early in the developmental cycle. However, whether or not affirmative action should be 
practiced early or late in a development cycle is a subtle empirical question on which little evidence 
exists. 
The trade-offs of early versus late affirmative action can be illustrated with another thought 
experiment: Suppose that the higher education establishment wants to increase its share of minority 
faculty, and that this goal can be attempted in one of two ways – by lowering hiring standards for 
newly minted minority Ph.D. students; or, by changing graduate admissions policies to admit more 
minority graduate students. Let there be a cost to making a mistake in each stage – that is, 
admitting graduate students who do not do well is costly, as is hiring newly minted Ph.D.s who turn 
out to be unqualified.  Finally, suppose that hiring an unqualified faculty member is more costly 
than admitting an unqualified graduate student.  Given this set-up, which approach is preferable?  
The answer depends on the empirical details of the case. 
The distinction we are drawing here between early and late affirmative action is similar to 
the distinction highlighted in Loury (1997) between developmental and preferential affirmative 
action. The benefits from the earlier affirmative action are developmental, in that it enhances the 
skills of some minority students.  However, to derive the expected cost of affirmative action in this 
stage we must consider the proportion of those admitted who will not complete the program, taking 
due account of the losses experienced when matriculates do not complete their studies.  Hence, 
affirmative action in graduate admissions will tend to be a good idea if the early investments pay 
off for a substantial group, but will tend to be a bad idea if the resulting attrition rates are too high 
and too costly. Focusing affirmative action at the later stage of faculty hiring stage is advantageous 
when one wants to narrowly target the preferential treatment to particular individuals within the   17 
preferred group. However, it will be disadvantageous if the costs of hiring some unqualified faculty 
are sufficiently high.  Fang and Fryer (2004) provide a model based on this intuition which shows 
that, when it comes to affirmative action, earlier need not be better. 
This issue is related to the broader question of whether efforts to ameliorate the effects of 
racial disparity in socioeconomic background should be undertaken early or later in the life cycle. 
Heckman and Krueger (2002) provide a lively discussion of the efficacy of interventions 
throughout the life cycle. Early childhood interventions such as the Perry Preschool Project and the 
Abcedarian Project seem to have large effects on test scores, schooling attainment, and crime 
reduction. The results from adolescent interventions are mixed, which is illustrated in the disparate 
results from analysis of the Job Start and Job Corps programs. Job Corps is the nation’s largest and 
most comprehensive residential, education and job training program for at-risk youth, ages 16 
through 24. It takes the students to (predominantly rural) training centers where they receive free 
room and board along with intense training in one of 100 vocational specializations. Conversely, 
Job Start uses the same teaching curricula as Job Corps, but the students stay at home and commute 
to a local training site. Job Corps seems to increase earnings and reduce crime, whereas, Job Start 
has statistically insignificant effects.
12 
The disparities between Job Corps and Job Start initiatives suggest that peer group 
externalities may be important. Assisting a large fraction of students in a particular neighborhood 
could cause positive spillovers, and these spillovers could be self-enforcing. The magnitudes of 
these externalities will likely differ across environments, and change in complicated ways as 
children age and develop their identities – making a thorough cost-benefit analysis quite difficult. 
                                                 
12 See <http://www.jobcorps.org> and <http://www.mdrc.org/project_9_60.html> for results on Job Corp and Job Start 
programs, respectively. 
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As such, whether or not affirmative action is better to introduce early or late in the developmental 
life cycle remains an open empirical question. 
 
Myth #6: Many Non-minority Citizens are Directly Affected by Affirmative Action. 
 
Many white Americans hold erroneous perceptions about the costs they incur due to racial 
preferences favoring blacks and Hispanics.  According to our calculations based on data from the 
2000 General Social Survey (GSS), 40 percent of whites over the age of 18 believe it likely that 
they or someone they know were rejected from a college due to an unqualified black applicant 
being admitted.  Yet Kane (1998) has shown that racial preferences in admissions are given only at 
the most elite 20 percent of colleges and universities and, even at these colleges, the impact of 
racial preferences on the typical white applicant’s admission probability is small. As a back-of-the-
envelope calculation, assume that elite colleges and universities accept 20 percent of their applicant 
pool (the true percentage is probably lower) and that 15 percent of their incoming students are 
black or Hispanic.  If one makes the extreme and clearly incorrect assumption that all admissions 
of blacks and Hispanics to elite colleges and universities are a result of affirmative action, then 3 
percent of all selective college admissions in a given year would be the result of affirmative action.  
Very few of the 80 percent of those rejected by selective colleges could possibly fit into the 3 
percent of admissions  affected by affirmative action..  Evidently, many rejected white applicants 
imagine themselves to have fallen just below the margin of acceptance though, by definition, this 
could be true for only a few of them.  Such perceptual biases could cause the aggregate subjective 
cost of racial affirmative action to far exceed the policy’s objective burden.    19 
This observation has particular force if we take value-added, not absolute performance, as 
the proper outcome measure in a college’s objective function.  Indeed, Dale and Krueger (2002) 
demonstrate that there is little incremental payoff for individuals from advantaged backgrounds 
associated with attending selective colleges, whereas the benefit for disadvantaged students is 
substantive. Thus, even if a non-trivial share of advantaged whites were to have been displaced 
from elite universities due to the preferential admission of minority candidates – which is not the 
case – this would probably have little impact on the lifetime incomes of advantaged whites while, 
as Bowen and Bok (1998) have stressed, the benefits for disadvantaged minorities could be 
substantial. 
Kane (1998) offers a useful analogy explaining why the perceived costs of race-targeted 
policies might exceed the actual cost.  Suppose a single unused parking space in front of a popular 
restaurant is reserved for disabled drivers.  Non-disabled drivers who observe the unused space 
while trying to park might resent this policy, imagining that it prolongs their parking search.  But 
when parking is tight it is likely that, even if the disabled space were not reserved, it would already 
have been taken by the time a given driver comes along.  When many non-disabled drivers 
overestimate their chance of getting the unreserved space, the perceived cost of a policy favoring 
the disabled could be large, despite fact that the policy has a negligible effect on the mean duration 
of a parking search.  So too, it would seem, with racial affirmative action in higher education. 
 
Myth #7: Affirmative Action Always Helps its Beneficiaries. 
 
  Many supporters of affirmative action policy believe that, irrespective of the cost, 
affirmative action always helps its beneficiaries. That is, it is better to attend an institution because   20 
of preferential treatment than not to attend.  Moreover, supporters of affirmative action argue that 
minorities admitted under affirmative action are likely to benefit from the myriad academic, social, 
and network externalities that exists at selective institutions. 
  A recent controversial paper by Richard Sander (2005) offers the disturbing possibility that, 
at least in the context of legal education, affirmative action may actually harm its beneficiaries. The 
paper reports some useful and troubling facts. Using data on a national cohort of 27,000 law school 
students gathered from 95 percent of accredited law schools in the United States, Sander finds that 
the median black student starting law school in 1991 earned first-year grades comparable to those 
of a white student at the 7
th or 8
th percentile of the overall grade distribution. Roughly 52 percent of 
black first–year law students fall in the lowest decile of the overall grade distribution; 83 percent 
fall in the bottom three deciles. Furthermore, Sander presents evidence that lower first-year grades 
are associated with lower rates of law school completion and lower odds of passing the bar exam. 
Thus, Sander argues it is theoretically possible (given certain assumptions on the educational 
production function and on the determinants of the supply of black lawyers) that even though 
eliminating affirmative action would cause fewer blacks to be enrolled at elite law schools, it could 
also cause the number of practicing black lawyers to increase.  This counter-intuitive result is 
possible because, without affirmative action, black students would enroll in greater numbers at less 
selective law schools and be more likely to graduate from law school and to pass the bar exam. 
We are not here endorsing (or disputing) the conclusions in Sander (2005), as they rest on a 
number of hotly disputed counterfactual hypotheses concerning the behavior of prospective black 
law students which are difficult to assess.  Moreover, since the cost-benefit analysis of preferential 
admissions depends explicitly on the value society places on the production of successful black 
lawyers, a social welfare function that puts enough weight on successes relative to non-successes   21 
might continue to favor a preferential admissions policy even when it is known to yields inferior 
outcomes for many of its intended beneficiaries.  Nevertheless, empirical findings such as this must 
give a prudent analyst pause, and strongly suggest that it would be unwise to assume that racial 
preferences are always helpful for their intended beneficiaries. 
 
The Clarifying Power of Economic Analysis  
 
Heated argument over affirmative action will surely continue for years to come.  Supporters 
of these policies recently won an important victory in the area of education with the Supreme Court 
decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger (02-516 [2003]) and Grutter v. Bollinger (02-241 [2003]).
13 
Although the court issued a split decision, deciding in favor of the University of Michigan Law 
school and against the undergraduate college, the two decisions rejected the position that the 
Constitution requires race-blind admissions policies at public colleges.  As Justice O’Connor 
declared in her majority opinion in Grutter: “Student body diversity is a compelling state interest 
that can justify using race in university admissions.”  Yet the Supreme Court also expressed 
ambivalence about race-conscious public policies.  
We believe that economic reasoning can make a contribution to the affirmative action 
debate. This paper shows the insights that can be gained when one respects the consistency 
requirements of formal definitions, remains mindful of incentives, and recalls that the behaviors of 
interacting agents must adjust to be mutually compatible in equilibrium.  These are the mainstays 
                                                 
13 New admissions guidelines for entering freshman at the University of Michigan have been adopted as a result. The 
full text of these opinions is available through the U.S. Supreme Court website at  
<http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/02slipopinion.html>. Loury et al. (2003) is a legal brief considered by the 
Supreme Court in the University of Michigan affirmative action litigation.   22 
of the analytic discipline conveyed by economic reasoning, and we have tried to show how their 
consistent application can enrich the study of affirmative action policy. 
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